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JURISDICTION
Plaintiff and appellant Doug Scott and Estate of Ruth Lyndevall Scott (hereafter
collectively referred to as "Mr. Scott") appeal a final order of the Third District Court,
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, granting defendant and appellee HK Contractors, Inc.'s
Motion for Summary Judgment. The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this
matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
ISSUE #1:

Did the trial court correctly determine that there were no genuine

issues as to any material fact and that, as a mater of law, HK Contractors, Inc. was
entitled to summary judgment in its favor on Mr. Scott's negligence claim due to Mr.
Scott's failure to produce evidence that HK Contractors, Inc.'s alleged negligence
proximately caused Mr. Scott's alleged injuries?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: In reviewing a trial court's grant of summary
judgment, this Court reviews the trial court's decision for correctness, giving no
deference to the trial court's resolution of the legal issues presented. Bansasine v. BodelL
927 P.2d 675, 676 (Ut. Ct. App. 1996). This issue was preserved in the trial court. (R.
420-424).
ISSUE #2:

Did the trial court correctly conclude that an out-of-court statement

made by decedent Ruth Scott to her husband two hours after her automobile accident was
hearsay and not admissible as a present sense impression, excited utterance, or pursuant to
1

the residual hearsay exception?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The standard of review on the admissibility of
hearsay evidence is three-fold: the Court reviews the legal questions to make the
determination of admissibility for correctness; the Court reviews the questions of fact for
clear error; and the court reviews the trial court's ruling on admissibility for abuse of
discretion. State v. Workman, 2005 UT 66, Tf 10; 122 P.3d 639. This issue was preserved
in the trial court. (R. 420-424).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES,
AND REGULATIONS
RULES
Utah R. Civ. P. 56:
(b)
For defending party. A party against whom a claim,
counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought,
may, at any time, move for summary judgment as to all or any part thereof.
(c)
Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion,
memoranda and affidavits shall be in accordance with Rule 7. The judgment
sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary
judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of
liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of
damages.
UtahR. Evid. 803:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the
declarant is available as a witness:

2

(1) Present sense impression. A statement describing or explaining an event
or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition
or immediately thereafter.
(2) Excited utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or condition
made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the
event or condition.
Utah R. Evid. 807:
A statement not specifically covered by Rule 803 or Rule 804 but having
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness is not excluded by
the hearsay rule if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as
evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point
for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can
procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purpose of these
rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the
statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under
this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party
sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party
with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, the proponent's intention to
offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the name and address
of the declarant.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE: This negligence/wrongful death action asserted by
Mr. Scott against HK Contractors, Inc. (hereafter "HK Contractors") arises out of a single
motor vehicle accident that occurred at a road construction site in Salt Lake County, Utah.
(R. 137-139). In November 2002, HK Contractors excavated asphalt across 3900 South
and approximately 900 West and dug trenches for the installation of various pipes and
sewer lines as part of the Central Valley Water Reclamation Project. (R. 137-139). Prior
to HK Contractors commencing its work on the project, Central Valley Water retained a
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licensed civil engineer, Bradley Paxman, to design a traffic control plan to manage road
traffic at the construction zone. (R. 137-139). The traffic control plan complied with the
Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices and local and state law requirements. (R.
137-139) The traffic control plan was then implemented by Utah Barricade Company,
Inc. (hereafter "Utah Barricade"). (R. 137-139). Once installed by Utah Barricade in
accord with Mr. Paxman's design, the traffic plan was not altered or modified in any way.
(R. 137-139). Thereafter, in the early afternoon of November 18, 2002, Mrs. Scott, then
77 years old, was driving westbound on 3900 South alone in her vehicle. (R. 137-139).
Mrs. Scott came upon the Central Valley Project road construction at approximately 875
West and drove her vehicle into the construction zone and into an open trench. (R. 137139). Mrs. Scott died several months later. (R. 373-374). In November 2004, Mr. Scott
filed this suit against HK Contractors and Utah Barricade alleging that Mrs. Scott's
accident and death was caused by their negligence. (R. 1-6).
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS: In March 2006, HK Contractors filed a motion
for summary judgment asserting that there were no genuine issues as to any material fact
and that HK Contractors was entitled to judgment in its favor, as a matter of law, because
Mr. Scott had failed to produce any evidence of negligence on the part of HK Contractors
and no evidence that HK Contractors' alleged negligence proximately caused Mrs. Scott's
accident. (R. 135, 168). More specifically, HK Contractors argued that the undisputed
evidence established that HK Contractors satisfied its duty to the traveling public by
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having in place, prior to commencing its road work, a traffic control plan prepared by a
licensed civil engineer that complied with all local, state, and federal standards for the
road construction project. (R. 135). Utah Barricade joined in HK Contractors' motion.
(R. 173).
Mr. Scott opposed HK Contractors' motion. (R. 184). He submitted affidavits
from three witnesses alleging that (at unspecified times) they had driven through the
construction area where Mrs. Scott's accident occurred and that they believed the traffic
control plan was insufficient and not properly maintained. (R. 188, 194, 212). Mr. Scott
argued these affidavits created a dispute of material fact as to whether HK Contractors
and Utah Barricade were negligent. (R. 184).
In reply, HK Contractors argued that the individuals that submitted affidavits in
opposition to HK Contractors' motion lacked foundation to testify regarding the
sufficiency of traffic control procedures at the construction site. (R. 203-211). Moreover,
HK Contractors pointed out that the affiants did not dispute the material facts of the case.
Specifically, the affiants did not dispute that during HK Contractors work on the Central
Valley project, a traffic control plan was in place to guide traffic safely through the
construction zone. IdL The affiants did not dispute that this traffic control plan was
designed by a licensed civil engineer and implemented by Utah Barricade in accordance
with that design. Id And the affiants did not dispute that the traffic control plan
complied with the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices as required by Utah law.

5

Id. Finally, HK Contractors pointed out that the affiants did not witness Mrs. Scott's
accident and they could not testify to the actual cause of the accident, id.
On July 18, 2006, the trial court heard oral argument on HK Contractors' motion
for summary judgement. (R. 450, p. 3-14). The trial court held its ruling on the motion in
abeyance and granted the plaintiff thirty days to (1) properly designate an expert, and (2)
produce evidence giving rise to an inference that HK Contractors and Utah Barricade did
not comply with the governing standards for traffic control at the construction site. (R.
450, p. 12-14).
Thereafter, Mr. Scott designated Larry Griffiths as an expert and submitted his
report. (R. 248). Mr. Griffiths, an expert in construction documents but having no
experience with traffic control in general or the Manual on Uniform Traffic Devices in
particular, opined that the traffic control plan at the area of Mrs. Scott's accident was
substandard. (R. 248, 257, 270). HK Contractors deposed Mr. Griffiths, and the parties
submitted to the trial court supplemental briefing on Mr. Griffiths' testimony and the
traffic control issue. (R. 255, 264, 285, 327).
On October 30, 2006, the trial court again heard oral argument on HK Contractors'
motion for summary judgment. (R. 450, p. 15-105). At this hearing, the trial court again
held its ruling on HK Contractors' motion in abeyance. (R. 450, p. 102-105). The trial
court considered Mr. Scott's argument that there were disputes of material fact as to
whether HK Contractors and Utah Barricade were negligent, however the trial court
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observed that even if Mr. Scott established negligence on the part of HK Contractors and
Utah Barricade, he had not produced evidence indicating that the alleged negligence was
a proximate cause of Mrs. Scott's accident. (R. 450, p. 72-73). The trial court then
allowed Mr. Scott leave to submit evidence on the issue of causation together with legal
support proving the admissibility of the evidence. (R. 450, p. 102-105).
Mr. Scott then filed an affidavit in which he averred that two hours after Mrs.
Scott's accident she told him that she was confused about which way to travel through the
construction area. (R. 373-374). Mr. Scott submitted a brief arguing that the statement
was admissible pursuant to Utah R. Evid. 601(b). (R. 363). HK Contractors and Utah
Barricade filed a joint reply to Mr. Scott's brief arguing that Utah R. Evid. 601(b) did not
allow admission of Mrs. Scott's hearsay statement. (R. 375). HK Contractors and Utah
Barricade further argued that Mrs. Scott's out-of-court statement was hearsay and not
admissible as a present sense impression or excited utterance under Utah R. Evid. 803(1)
and (2). (R. 375.) Mr. Scott filed a reply brief in support of the admissibility of Mrs.
Scott's statement. (R. 383).
Mr. Scott then settled with Utah Barricade and Utah Barricade was dismissed from
the case. (R. 402).
On April 6, 2007, the trial court again heard oral argument on HK Contractors'
motion for summary judgment. (R. 450, p. 106-125). The trial court considered Mr.
Scott's affidavit and his arguments that Mrs. Scott's out-of-court statement was
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admissible under Utah R. Evid. 803(1) and (2) as a present sense impression or excited
utterance and that the statement should be admitted under Utah R. Evid. 807. Id. The
trial court disagreed with Mr. Scott and ruled the statement did not qualify as either a
present sense impression or excited utterance. (R. 450, p. 122). The trial court also found
that Mrs. Scott's statement lacked the inherent reliability necessary for admission under
Utah R. Evid. 807. Id. Further, the trial court concluded that even if the statement were
admitted, it did not give rise to a question of material fact on the issue of proximate cause.
(R.450,p. 124-125).
DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL COURT: Ruling from the bench on April 6,
2007, the trial court held that Mr. Scott had not presented sufficient evidence on the issue
of proximate cause to preclude summary judgment and therefore granted HK Contractors'
motion for summary judgment. (R. 450, p. 121-122,124-125). HK Contractors prepared
and submitted Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. (R. 420). Mr. Scott objected to
the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. (R. 417). On April 20, 2007, the
trial court entered the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order Granting the
Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant HK Contractors, Inc. (R. 420).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

In approximately October 2002, Central Valley Water Reclamation hired

HK Contractors to work on a construction project located at 3900 South and 900 West in
Salt Lake City (Salt Lake County), Utah. This project, known as Central Valley Project
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job number 4657.0008 (the "Central Valley project"), involved constmction of various
pipes and sewer lines across 3900 South in South Salt Lake City (Salt Lake County),
Utah. (R. 137-139).
2.

The Central Valley project required that roadway asphalt on 3900 South be

excavated and trenches dug for placement of various pipes and sewer lines. This work
required that traffic detours be put in place to control traffic around the trenches. (R. 137139).
3.

Central Valley Water Reclamation hired DMJM Architects to design and

provide a traffic control plan compliant with the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control
Devices for the management of motor vehicle traffic at the Central Valley project. (R.
137-139).
4.

Bradley Paxman, a professional Civil Engineer registered by the State of

Utah, worked for DMJM. Mr. Paxman served as DMJM's project manager for the
Central Valley project. (R. 137-139).
5.

As the project manager on behalf of DMJM, Mr. Paxman oversaw a team of

engineers and staff who were involved in creating various documents, specifications, and
plans for the Central Valley project. (R. 137-139).
6.

DMJM prepared a traffic control plan for the Central Valley project. The

traffic control plan was prepared under the direction and control of Mr. Paxman, and it
bears his signature and professional engineering stamp. (R. 137-139).

9

7.

The DMJM designed traffic contiol plan complied with the Manual on

Uniform Tiaffic Control Devices and all other governmental requirements for tiaffic
control at the Central Valley project (R 137-139)
8.

HK Contractors hired Utah Barricade to implement the tiaffic control plan

at the Cential Valley project (R 137-139)
9.

Prior to Utah Barricade implementing the traffic control plan designed by

Mr Paxman Doug Coleman, an estimator foi Utah Barricade, reviewed the plan and
relied upon the Mr Paxman's professional engineering stamp of approval certifying that
the plan complied with all applicable local, state, and federal government road
construction standards and requirements (R 137-139)
10

Utah Barricade implemented the tiaffic control plan designed and certified

by Mr Paxman (R 137-139)
11

Dunng construction of the project, Doug Coleman, as part of his job duties

with Utah Barricade, periodically visited the project site to confirm that the traffic control
plan was implemented m accord with Mi Paxman's plans (R 137-139)
12

No individual, company, oi government entity ever objected to the manner

in which the traffic control plan was implemented by Utah Bamcade (R 137-139)
13

HK Contractors never modified or altered the traffic control plan

implemented by Utah Barricade (R 137-139)
14

In the afternoon of November 18, 2002, Mrs Scott, then 77 years old, was
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driving westbound on 3900 South alone in her vehicle. Mrs. Scott came upon the Central
Valley project road construction at approximately 875 West and followed the barricades
and signs signaling traffic detours through the construction area. (R. 137-139).
15.

While in the construction zone, Mrs. Scott did not follow the barricades and

signs directing traffic in the construction zone and drove her vehicle into an open trench.
(R. 137-139).
16.

Mr. Scott filed suit against HK Contractors and Utah Barricade in

November 2004 alleging they were negligent and liable for his wife's death. (R. 1).
17.

In March 2006, HK Contractors filed a motion for and memorandum in

support of summary judgment asserting first, that HK Contractors was not negligent, and
second, that HK Contractors' alleged negligence was not a proximate cause of Mrs.
Scott's accident. (R. 168, 110).
18.

In opposition to HK Contractors' motion for summary judgment, Mr. Scott

submitted affidavits from three men stating that at unspecified times they had driven
through the construction area and believed the traffic control and safety measures were
insufficient. (R. 184-187, 188, 194,212).
19.

HK Contractors argued that the affidavits submitted by Mr. Scott lacked

foundation and the witnesses could not opine as to the sufficiency of the traffic control
and safety measures at the construction site. Further, HK Contractors argued that the
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affidavits failed to raise a genuine dispute as to the proximate cause of Mrs Scott's
accident (R 203-211)
20

On July 18, 2006, the trial court heard oral argument on HK Contiactors'

motion for summary judgment The trial couit held its ruling on the motion in abeyance
and directed Mr Scott to produce additional evidence regarding HK Contractors' alleged
negligence (R 450, p 12-14)
21.
affidavit

Mr Scott designated Larry Griffiths as an expert and submitted his
(R 248) Mr Guffiths, an expert in construction documents, but having no

expenence with tiaffic control in geneial or the Manual on Uniform Traffic Devices in
particular, opined that the traffic control plan at the area of Mis Scott's accident was
substandard (R 248, 257, 270) HK Contractors deposed Mi Griffiths, and the parties
submitted to the tnal couit supplemental bnefing on Mr Griffiths' testimony and the
traffic control issue (R 255, 264, 285, 327)
22

On October 30, 2006, the trial court again heard oral argument on HK

Contractors' motion for summary judgment (R 450, p 15-105) This time the tnal court
stated that Mi Scott may have pioduced sufficient evidence to create an issue of fact as to
HK Conti actors' alleged negligence, however he had not produced any evidence on the
issue of proximate cause (R 450, p 72-73) The trial court held its ruling on HK
Contractors' motion m abeyance and directed plaintiff to submit evidence on the issue of
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causation together with legal support for the admissibility of the evidence. (R. 450, p.
102-105).
23.

Mr. Scott then filed an affidavit in which he stated that two hours after his

wife's accident she told him that "she was confused about which way to travel through
the construction area." (R. 373-374). Mr. Scott's affidavit did not provide any detail
regarding Mrs. Scott's mental or emotional state or the circumstances existing when she
made her statement. Id. Mr. Scott also filed a Memorandum Regarding Causation
Evidence and Hearsay. In that memorandum, Mr. Scott argued that Mrs. Scott's
statement was admissible under Utah R. Evid. 601(b). (R. 363-366). Mr. Scott did not
submit any other evidence on the issue of proximate cause. Id
24.

HK Contractors filed an opposing memorandum arguing that Utah R. Evid.

601(b) did not apply to Mrs. Scott's out-of-court statement. (R. 375-382). Additionally,
HK Contractors argued that Mrs. Scott's statement was hearsay and did not qualify for
admission as a present sense impression or excited utterance under Utah R. Evid. 803. Id.
25.

Mr. Scott then filed a Supplement to Memorandum Regarding Causation

and Hearsay in which he argued that Mrs. Scott's hearsay statement qualified for
admission as a present sense impression or excited utterance under Utah R. Evid. 803.
(R. 383-389).
26.

On April 6, 2007, the trial court again heard oral argument on HK

13

Contractors" motion foi summary judgment (R 450, p 106-125) The tual couit
considered Mi Scott's affidavit and Mrs Scott's out-of-court statement and concluded
that the heaisay statement did not qualify foi admission as a present sense impression or
excited utteiance under Utah R Evid 803 (R 450, p 121-122) The trial court also
concluded that Mis Scott's statement lacked the inherent lehabihty necessaiy for
admission under Utah R Evid 807 kj_ The trial court therefore ruled the statement was
inadmissible hearsay Id_
27.

The trial court further held that even if Mrs Scott's statement was

admitted, Mi Scott still had not pioduced sufficient evidence to cieate a dispute of
material fact on the issue of proximate cause and granted HK Contractors' motion for
summary judgment (R 450, p 124-125)
28

On April 20, 2007, the trial court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions

of Law and Older Gianting the Motion for Summary Judgment of HK Contiactois, Inc
(R 420)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court should affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of
HK Contiactois because Mr Scott failed to pioduce admissible evidence that HK
Contractors' alleged negligence proximately caused Mrs Scott's accident and his alleged
injuries Under Utah law, Mr Scott bore the burden of not only establishing that HK
Contractors was negligent, but also whether that negligence proximately caused his
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alleged injunes See Mitchell v Peaison Enters , 697 P 2d 240, 245 (Utah 1985)
("Demonstrating matenal issues of fact with respect to defendants1 negligence is not
sufficient to preclude summary judgment if there is no evidence that establishes a duect
causal connection between that alleged negligence and the mjuiy ") Although Mi Scott
sought to offer a hearsay statement from Mrs Scott on the issue of causation, the trial
court correctly concluded that the statement was inadmissible hearsay, and even if it was
admissible it would not provide the necessaiy causal link between HK Contiactors'
alleged negligence and Mr Scott's alleged injuries The tiial court lightly concluded that
Mr Scott had offered a mere choice ot piobabihties as to why Mrs Scott diove her
vehicle improperly through the construction site, and that there was no evidence upon
which a juiy could reasonably conclude theie was a greater probability that Mis Scott
was misled into the tiench by the alleged negligence of HK Contractois than for some
other reason Because of the paucity of evidence on the necessary element of proximate
cause, the trial court properly granted HK Contractors' motion for summary judgment
The trial court also correctly concluded that Mrs Scott's out-of-court statement
was inadmissible hearsay According to Mr Scott's affidavit, Mrs Scott made her
statement two hours after her accident Because the statement was not made
contemporaneously with the accident, the statement is not admissible as a present sense
impression under Utah R Evid 803(1) Further, the statement is not admissible as an
excited utterance under Utah R Evid 803(2) because there is no evidence that Mrs
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Scott's statement was made while she was still under the stress of excitement caused by
the automobile accident and was not the product of reflective thought. Finally, the
statement is not admissible under Utah R. Evid. 807, the residual hearsay exception,
because the statement does not meet the rule's high requirements for inherent reliability
and trustworthiness. The trial court correctly excluded Mrs. Scott's hearsay statement.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED HK CONTRACTORS
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE MR. SCOTT
FAILED TO PRODUCE EVIDENCE THAT ANY ALLEGED
NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF HK CONTRACTORS
PROXIMATELY CAUSED MRS. SCOTT'S ACCIDENT.

In order to successfully state a negligence claim against HK Contractors, Mr. Scott
bore the burden of establishing the four necessary elements of a negligence clam: that HK
Contractors owed him a duty; that HK Contractors breached the duty; that the breach of
duty was the proximate cause of his injury; and that there was in fact an injury. See
Steffensen v. Smith's Mgmt. Corp., 820 P.2d 482, 486 (Ut. Ct. App. 1991). After the
case had been pending for several months and after affording Mr. Scott time to conduct
discovery, HK Contractors filed a motion for summary judgment because the undisputed
material facts established that HK Contractors had not breached any duty allegedly owed
to the traveling public and that no alleged breach of duty by HK Contractors proximately
caused Mr. Scott's alleged injury and damages. HK Contractors and Mr. Scott fully
briefed the motion, and after three separate hearings on the motion, the trial court
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project, IIk Contractors complied with \ [tah law and aO appsuank -aaikL.,.:. oi ca;.
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liictl lull} -'omplicu vVitii the Manuai on Lnilonn Traffic

Control Devices and all other governmental atid contractual requirements for the
management of motor vehicle h a i x ... die area ol IIL < ondatlm
"\ tilles pio|e* i Mi

v il I

(I •< 'uih.il

»t on did noi di ,puu thai lln- lialTu control plan was prepared under

the direction of Bradley Paxman, a professional engineer registered with the State of
Utah, and that the plan bore his signature and professional engineering stamp certo ,ina,

» onsiiHi dun standard', and iri|iiirements. Mr. Scott did not dispute that Utah Barricade

implemented the traffic control plan in accordance with Mr. Paxman's design. Mr. Scott
did not dispute that once installed, Utah Barricade periodically visited the project site to
confirm that the traffic control plan was implemented in accord with Mr. Paxman's plans.
Mr. Scott did not dispute that no individual, company, or government entity ever objected
to the manner in which Utah Barricade implemented the traffic control plan. Finally, Mr.
Scott did not dispute that HK Contractors never altered or modified the traffic control
plan.
Instead of disputing these material facts, Mr. Scott merely submitted three
affidavits from three lay witnesses (James Boulton, Larry Griffiths, and George Peters)
generally asserting that they believed the traffic control and safety procedures at the
construction site were inadequate. (R. 188, 194, 212). Although these lay witnesses have
no experience with traffic control plans or governmental regulations regarding traffic
control and safety at roadway construction sites, they nevertheless stated that at
unspecified times when they traveled through the construction site (either before or after
Mrs. Scott's accident), they believed barrels were spaced too far apart, there were not
sufficient barricades, and there was a lack of flaggers. IcL Mr. Scott did not offer any
evidence on the issue of proximate cause.
While Mr. Scott sought to establish that HK Contractors negligently directed
traffic through the construction site, Mr. Scott's failure to produce evidence that HK
Contractors alleged negligence was a proximate cause of Mrs. Scott's accident is fatal his
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C 'oi iti actoi s was negligent, but also whcihci mat negligence proximaiely caused hi*alleged injuries. See Mitchell v. Pearson Enters., 697 P.2d 240, 24" H rfah i*'^-»
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suffjeienl In pu'i'lii'lr Miniinai's fixleiiKiil it dine is no evidence that establishes a direct
causal connection between that alleged negligence and IIK- injar. .""» Here, because there
was a mere choice of probabilities as to why Mrs. Scott travekw ,;,e wron^ ...:.n
the construction area and dun,

•

*"In"i• uI;111<uin mil ! uiifoftuiv and therefore summary
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was appropriate.

This case is factually similar to Lindsay v. Gibbons & Reed, 497 P.2d 28 (Utah
1972). In Lindsay, plain!u; i mdsa\ s u i l c w a s k i . . , .
111L1 hw;i\ lunsliiH InII

ii

I md.ii, alh ;• *'11 thai Ihe defendant hieh\va\ construction

con itn ictor, Gibbons and Reed, improperly i narked the construction zone, h i ' Lindsay

1

The constiuclion ^onc was located at I .':_• l'-1 near Blackrock, I Itah. The accident

occurred 200 to 300 feet west of the beginning of a highway construction project.
t lihbun:. a;; 11
. I-.V.-1 .. - n• . iu)\i\:
5

ii--* u,-. o-lanc hiehw ay

.J ' • ^parated by a median strip at the westbound and ca^thound lane-

Lime u! the aceidenL the westbound lane had not been opened and was baiiicadai - ,
flasherbairicad.es; all ti af I ic was routed over the easi
• csu.

-d

eed d
• • placed so as to block tin,

\1 (1:.

further alleged that the improper marking of the construction zone caused another
motorist, Ester Lewis, to become confused in the construction zone rendering him unable
to determine his proper lane in the construction zone. This alleged confusion then caused
Lewis to enter Lindsay's lane of travel resulting in a head-on collision.2 Both Lewis and
Lindsay's wife died from injuries sustained in the collision. Lindsay contended that
Gibbons and Reed was negligent and had breached a "duty to erect signs warning
travelers to keep right, two-way traffic, slow, and curve." IcL at p. 30. Further, Lindsay
argued that Gibbons and Reed's negligence proximately caused the accident and injuries.
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The Lindsay case proceeded to trial and the trial court directed a verdict in favor of
defendant Gibbons and Reed. The court found that no evidence had been introduced to
indicate that defendant was guilty of negligence which proximately caused or contributed
to cause the accident, and that the sole proximate cause, based upon the facts and the
evidence, appeared to be the illegal driving of Lewis. Id. at p. 30. On appeal, the Utah
Supreme Court affirmed. The Court stated:

entrance to the new westbound lane and to direct one into the right side lane. Id. at p. 30.
Apparently, as the Lewis vehicle emerged from the new eastbound lane in the

2

construction zone, the pavement widened and curved; the evidence indicated that the
Lewis vehicle traveled in a straight line, rather than following the curve and crossed
into the opposing lane of traffic and collided with Lindsay's vehicle. I d at p. 29.
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In the accident there was a 11lere chou.-* <>i probabilities a^ 10 win \-;- .' cwis was
in the wrong lane of traffic, and there was no basis in the evidence upon win. u she
jury could reasonably believe there was a greater probability that lie was misled
into the opposing lane rather than for some other reason.
I d a t p . 31.
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reflecting off a windshield, inedication she was taking, or h, i i.stemng to 01 au-ucar radio i t
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- .!- , ilMr. Scott ample opportunity to produce the evidence

necessary to support his negligence claim. Indeed, the trial court held three separate
..:i ..

hearings on 1 IK Contractor's mooon ha summary jtuh nc*
1

-•

' :.

*

inotioi i in abeyance and

"• \cu Mi. S^ott additiunal time to show die court "facts thai indicate whelhei oi jir.t the
- the contractor n die barricade company complied w uh <•, .i-,. , ^i.i.ipi^
standdid^
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\ ,m noni

ueneral construction du^uiiiciiib, but .omple ee
lacking in experience with traffic control plans and traffic control standards and
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regulations, asserting that the traffic control plan was inadequate. However, Mr. Scott
again did not submit any evidence on the issue of proximate cause. At the second
hearing, on October 30, 2006, the trial court considered the affidavits of Mr. Boulton, Mr.
Griffiths, and Mr. Peters submitted by Mr. Scott and stated:
Okay. Well, anything further that the plaintiff wants to say about it? I'm
particularly - if you can address the causation issue, seems to me that you
may have at least an arguable case to say that, "Yeah, they were negligent,
they didn't keep those barrels up, and they really should have had some
flagmen out there and they didn't."

So you've got to come in and you've got to show that this poor woman,
who - who was killed in this , you know, obviously tragic and - and sad and
regrettable thing, this incident, that - that somehow they did or didn't do
caused that. And it's not enough to say to a jury, "You know, there was
negligence." You've got to be able to connect the negligence with the
injuries. You've got to be able to show that her death was the proximate
result of- of the negligence. And, at this point, I'm having a hard time
making that connection based on the information you've provided and that
the defendants have provided.
(R. 450, p. 72-73). The trial court again held its ruling on HK Contractors' motion in
abeyance stating:
What I am going to do is I'm going to give the plaintiff ten days to submit a
brief that shows me some way that I can - first of all, I need -1 need to have
the substance of the evidence that will show the causation, and I need - and
I need it to be admissible. And some legal support for that.
(R. 450, p. 103). In response, Mr. Scott simply submitted an affidavit in which he stated
that hours after his wife's accident, she told him that "she was confused about which way
to travel through the construction area." (R. 373-374). Mr. Scott did not submit any
22

other evidence on tlic i:,^;* oi v ,.i.
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Mining" :i- I:** ^iii, the trial court correctly

concluded thai Mrs. Scoif b statement to her husband was inadmissible hearsay.
Therefore, the trial court ruled:
i: un-> V..IM t > WIIL. of tlio^c .IIUUIUXMI., w.iere ihcie . i p.i-.r. =._;. ol c1. ulence.
And \ou ha\ e to have enough evidence to be able to go to the j u r \ . •- -sere
lhe\ can make a decision, whether they want to belie\e the evidence or not
And in this case, e\en accepting the statement that she made to her husband
that she was contused about which w«i\ t o i r a w l I *•<•;. ' ''wA thai c o n n e c t
i •* :ih the '- M;i the actions of the defendant.
1?

.

.

-

..1CI. .wanted

1 d-; * . ni'.jetors 1 motion.
Mr. Scott correctly points out that this Court has previously stated that the "issue
of proximate cause slmum he iukv.u iiw.n • ;..
est ••

>

Me\

..:

•••• it: ..

"-^
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peculation, 01 (2) wh^ic

reasonable person^ could not differ on the inferences lo be derived from the e\ idenee on
proximate causation." Steffensen v. Smith's Mgmt. Corp., S2<- r Jo -i.^j. -*M
App. 1991). Ii i tl lis case, the ti ial con it i; pi opei 1) ' took tl te issi ic of pi oxii x tate causatioi i
» . t result of Mr. Scott's failure to produce evidence establishing a
causal connection between HK Contractors alleged negligence and Mr. Scott's alleged
injuries. Simply put, Mr, Scott's causatioi i. claii i i rested oi i pi ii e speci llatic i i ai id
conjee line and could in M hi piopn Iv Mihimln d lo fi |iii"
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Furthermore, Mr. Scott's reliance on the case of Rose v. Provo City, 2003 UT App
77; 67 P.3d 1017 is misplaced because the case is readily distinguishable. In Rose, the
plaintiff, Rose, filed a negligence suit against restaurant owners and Provo city for
injuries he allegedly sustained when he rode his bike into a city-owned ditch via an
asphalted planter strip used as a driveway by the restaurant. Id at ^f 1 -5. The case
proceeded to trial and the restaurant owners and Provo City argued that they were not
negligent in their maintenance of the asphalt planter and ditch. IcL at ^6. Furthermore,
they argued that Rose's negligence - his failure to keep a proper lookout - was the sole
proximate cause of his injuries. Id. at f 25. The trial court agreed and awarded a directed
verdict in favor of the defendants. Id. at ^]6. This Court reversed holding that Rose had
presented sufficient evidence on each element of his negligence claim and that the case
should not have been taken from the jury. kL at ^J29.
With respect to the proximate cause issue, this Court stated:
Although the evidence may suggest Rose negligently failed to keep a proper
lookout, the evidence presented was sufficient to raise "[a] question of fact
for the jury . . . as to whether his distribution of attention was reasonable."
Smith v. Bennett, 265 P.2d 401, 404 (1953). Further a jury could find that a
bicyclist could reasonably choose to exit over an apparent driveway rather
than a pedestrian bridge. Because "reasonable persons could differ on the
inferences to be derived from the evidence on proximate causation,"
Steffensen, 820 P.2d at 487, we conclude proximate cause presented a jury
question.
Idatf28.
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In this case, i m L e Kose.
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Scott's automobile accident. Micro is no evidence

whatsoevei tllat Mrs. Scott's attention was in ailyway distributed between competing
demands. There is no evidence that she was anymore con;,
*j car ahead of her, or her car

construction \\
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- ol dial lack ol evidence, the tnal court p i o p e r k decided the case as a

matter of law. See Steffensen, 820 P.2d at 487, This is not a case like Kose where
sufficient evidence on the issue ol proxima;
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i iiiaily, contrary to Mr. Scott's assertions in his opening bi ief, it was not
incumbent upon HK Contractors to show ii,..; mcic » • xoiiHHil
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1 In \t\u\ it was sufficient for I IK Contractors to

establish that there was no genuine issue ol material fact on the issue of proximate cause
i.ud ikr: Mr, Scon > ouM rot prevail at trial as a matter of ]nw See
I* 2d l><S'"i -•
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. •• • . ! nroximate cause,

- ••• - matenal lact and Mi. ^cott failed tt) produce an\
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admissible evidence on the issue of causation. Accordingly, the trial court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of HK Contractors should be affirmed.
II.

MRS. SCOTT'S STATEMENT TO HER HUSBAND THAT USHE
WAS CONFUSED ABOUT WHICH WAY TO TRAVEL THROUGH
THE CONSTRUCTION AREA55 MADE HOURS AFTER THE
ACCIDENT IS INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY AND THE TRIAL
COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED THE STATEMENT.

Mrs. Scott's alleged out-of-court statement to her husband, Mr. Scott, that "she
was confused about which way to travel through the construction area" is hearsay under
Utah R. Evid. 801. Mr. Scott concedes that the statement is hearsay, but argues that it
qualifies for admission as a "present sense impression" or an "excited utterance" pursuant
to Utah R. Evid. 803(1) and 803(2). Mr. Scott also argues the statement should be
admitted pursuant to Utah R. Evid. 807, the "catch-all" exception to the hearsay rule.1
The trial court correctly disagreed. Because Mrs. Scott did not make her statement
contemporaneously with her accident, her statement did not qualify for admission as a
present sense impression. Further, the statement did not qualify for admission as an
excited utterance because there was no indication that at the time Mrs. Scott made her

3

This Court should note that Mr. Scott did not raise his Utah R. Evid. 807 "catch-all"

exception argument in any of the pleadings he submitted to the trial court. (R. 363, 383).
Instead, Mr. Scott raised that argument for the first time at the final oral argument on HK
Contractors' motion for summary judgment. (R. 450, p. 107). Therefore, HK Contractors
was not given the opportunity to brief that argument for the trial court. (R. 375).
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statement she was undei the stress ol
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miobile accident.

" * or admission undei Liah K I \ id. SO"7 because

there was no indication that the statement was inherentlv rebaH^ or trustwoni.
court therefore correctly excluded Miv S^ui, > 4»ui «M - >
t
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hearsay.
Mi s Scoffs statement was not a present sense impression under I Itah R. Evid,
803(1) because it was not made contemporaneous wiih uw
as a present sense impression, th, . \ j .
u,,.„,„..
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..; !e while the

See State v. Smith, 909 P.2d 236, 240 (lItah

''"^ » i>"Chcnt sense impression must befcMiictly contemporaneous with tlle startling

event to be spontaneous"). Flere, Mr. Scott stated m4l. i.i.
approximate!'.

• •

- mm at 3:00 p.m. (R. 373-374).

< (UiM'inicntk because ol the lapse of time between the accident and Mrs. Scott's
statement, the statement does not qualify as a present sense impression.
Mrs. Scott's statement was not an excn.oi mu ;o.

\ id. 803(2)

because the passa}.»e ui lime Inlwvn I In* .i eident and her statement allowed ample
• > lor reflective thought unv ;hcie is no e\ idenee thd- Mrs Scott was still under
the stress of excitement caused by her autonym u

UL^M^.

—
.

State v. Mickelsom *>4 .
The I tab ^picnic i ^ n i has recognized a three-pronged test for
determining whether a statement is admissible under Rule 803(2).
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According to this test, a statement constitutes an excited utterance only
when (1) a startling event or condition occurred; (2) the statement was made
while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event
or condition, and (3) the statement relates to the startling event or condition.
State v. Cude, 784 P.2d 1197, 1200 (Utah 1989). Absent one or more of
these criteria, the statement may not be admitted as an excited utterance.
Mrs. Scott's statement is inadmissible because Mr. Scott cannot establish the second
prong of the three-prong test. There is absolutely no evidence that when Mrs. Scott stated
to her husband that "she was confused about which way to travel through the construction
area'1 she was still under the stress of excitement caused by the automobile accident. (R.
373-374). Remarkably, according to Mr. Scott, the statement was made approximately
two hours after his wife's accident. IdL This Court recognizes, as a general proposition,
that "as the time between the event and the statement increases, so does the reluctance to
find the statement an excited utterance." State v. Mickelson, 848 P.2d at 686 (citation
omitted). This Court also recognized, as a general rule of thumb, "that where the time
interval between the event and the statement is long enough to permit reflective thought,
the statement will be excluded in the absence of some proof that the declarant did not in
fact engage in a reflective thought process." Id. (quoting McCormick on Evidence, §297
at 856 (3d ed. 1984)).
The two hour interval between Mrs. Scott's accident and her conversation with Mr.
Scott at the hospital supports a presumption that the statement was not an excited
utterance but rather a product of reflective thought. Id. In order to rebut this
presumption, it was incumbent upon Mr. Scott to produce evidence that Mrs. Scott did
28

not engage in reflective thought before makn... nci NUIK me
was a reasonable kr.r, lui ilu uli i I,

nl \ rmifuimn" emotional distress, or that tl le

declai ai it was actually i lei vous or distrauglii ai the tnn« the statement was made, has
generally been accepted as adequate to rebut the presumption against excited UUCK. R ** "
Id. Here, there is no evidence in the reeoru -_;,.JI*ii11^

-.

-» «»!.-, ,1 .: ticment to Mr. ScoU. in m^ aftiekn ;i, Mi. _:^>t;
simply stated:
i .ii \\ ed a! die hospital at approximately 3:00 p.m. During this period of
• I id several short conversations with Ruth Scott. During the first
conversation 1 asked her what happened regarding the accident. Kuih Neott
stated to me that she was confused about w hich way to travel through the
constnjctioi nva. Shortly after this, Ruth Scott was taken to \-ra\.
(R. 373-374). r Fhis statement does vuA ivhni Ihe presumption, that the statement was a
product of reflective thought iiiiiici ihanane\...L . .:the co: , :

'-

•

n

• mat Mrs. Scott's alleged statement

was the product of emotional distress, the trial court correctly concluded that the
statement (id -IOI t.uaiifv for admission as an excited utterance.
• :hermore\ Mi.,. :s>vO; N slalnm ml ilnl mil i|ii ilih lm idimv-niui imdrrthe
i\. LA id. 807 because the statement lacked inherent
reliability and guai antees of trustworthiness. "The residual hearsay exception is U* he
used rarely and construed strictly,"1 State \ . workman, _ (emphasis added i I ulln i 1 Ihih < tipprIhiti " mu
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. >w tiie admission of lieau>a)

evidence under the residual exception when the high requirements of rule 804(b)(5) are
met."4 IcL (emphasis added). Utah R. Evid. 807 states:
A statement not specifically covered by Rule 803 or 804 but having
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness is not excluded by
the hearsay rule if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as
evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point
for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can
procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purpose of these
rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of
statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under
this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party
sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party
with a fair opportunity to meet it, the proponent's intention to offer the
statement and the particulars of it, including the name and address of the
declarant.
Mr. Scott has not produced evidence sufficient to meet the high requirements of this rule.
In determining whether a hearsay statement bears circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness equivalent to the trustworthiness inherent in the established hearsay
exceptions, a court should consider: (1) the probable motivation of the declarant in
making the statement; (2) the circumstances under which it was made; (3) the knowledge
and qualifications of the declarant; (4) the character of the declarant for truthfulness and
honesty and the availability of evidence on the issue; (5) whether the statement was given
voluntarily under oath, subject to cross examination and subject to perjury; (6) the extent

4

In 2004, Utah R. Evid. 804 was amended and subsection (b)(5) was deleted. The

residual hearsay exception is now found in Utah R. Evid. 807. The provisions of rule 807
are identical to the provisions of former rule 803(24) and 804(b)(5).
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inherent reliability or trustworthiness that would qualify it for admission under Rule 807.
Accordingly, after finding that Mrs. Scott's statement was not "inherently reliable," the
trial court properly excluded statement as inadmissible hearsay. (R. 450, p. 122).
CONCLUSION
The trial court gave very careful consideration to HK Contractors' motion for
summary judgment and allowed Mr. Scott three separate opportunities to produce
sufficient evidence to defeat the motion. Indeed, the trial court gave Mr. Scott clear
direction on the evidence he needed to produce to defeat the motion. However, Mr. Scott
failed to meet his burden and the trial court correctly granted HK Contractors' motion for
summary judgment. This Court should affirm the trial court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of HK Contractors. Mr. Scott failed to produce evidence on the issue
of proximate cause, a necessary element of his negligence claim. Mrs. Scott's out of
court statement was inadmissible hearsay, and even if admitted the statement did not
provide a causal connection between HK Contractors alleged negligence and Mr. Scott's
alleged injuries.
DATED this 24th day of April, 2008.
PLANT, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL

TERRY M. PLANT
H. AUSTIN HITT
Attorneys for Appellee HK Contractors, Inc.
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STATE RULES
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE
ARTICLE V I I I . HEARSAY
Utah R. Evid. Rule 803 (2008)
Review Court Orders which may amend this Rule
Rule 803. Hearsay exceptions; availability of declarant immaterial.
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is
available as a witness:
(1) Present sense impression.
A statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while the
declarant was perceiving the event or condition or immediately thereafter.
(2) Excited utterance.
A statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was
under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.
(3) Then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition.
A statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or
physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and
bodily health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact
remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation, identification,
or terms of declarant's will.
(4) Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment.
Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing
medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception
or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably
pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.
(5) Recorded recollection.
A memorandum or record concerning a matter about which a witness once had
knowledge but now has insufficient recollection to enable the witness to testify fully
and accurately, shown to have been made or adopted by the witness when the
matter was fresh in the witness' memory and to reflect that knowledge correctly. If
admitted, the memorandum or record may be read into evidence but may not itself
be received as an exhibit unless offered by an adverse party.
(6) Records of regularly conducted activity.

A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events,
conditions, opinions or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from information
transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly
conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business
activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown
by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, or by certification that
complies with Rule 902(11), Rules 902(12), or a statute permitting certification,
unless the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation
indicate lack of trustworthiness. The term "business" as used in this paragraph
includes business, institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling of
every kind, whether or not conducted for profit.
(7) Absence of entry in records kept in accordance with the provisions of
paragraph (6)
Evidence that a matter is not included in the memoranda, reports, records, or data
compilations, in any form, kept in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph (6),
to prove the nonoccurrence or nonexistence of the matter, if the matter was of a
kind of which a memorandum, report, record, or data compilation was regularly
made and preserved, unless the sources of information or other circumstances
indicate lack of trustworthiness.
(8) Public records and reports.
Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form, of public offices or
agencies, setting forth (A) the activities of the office or agency, or (B) matters
observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to
report, excluding, however, in criminal cases matters observed by police officers and
other law enforcement personnel, or (C) in civil actions and proceedings and against
the Government in criminal cases, factual findings resulting from an investigation
made pursuant to authority granted by law, unless the sources of information or
other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.
(9) Records of vital statistics.
Records or data compilations, in any form, of births, fetal deaths, deaths, or
marriages, if the report thereof was made to a public office pursuant to requirements
of law
(10) Absence of public record or entry.
To prove the absence of a record, report, statement, or data compilation, in any
form, or the nonoccurrence or nonexistence of a matter of which a record, report,
statement, or data compilation in any form, was regularly made and preserved by a
public office or agency, evidence in the form of a certification in accordance with Rule
902, or testimony, that diligent search failed to disclose the record, report,
statement, or data compilation, or entry.
(11) Records of religious organization.
Statements of births, marriages, divorces, deaths, legitimacy, ancestry,
relationship by blood or marriage, or other similar facts of personal or family history,
contained in a regularly kept record of a religious organization.
(12) Marriage, baptismal, and similar certificates.
Statements of fact contained in a certificate that the maker performed a marriage
or other ceremony or administered a sacrament, made by a clergyman, public
official, or other person authorized by the rules or practices of a religious

organization or by law to perform the act certified, and purporting to have been
issued at the time of the act or within a reasonable time thereafter.
(13) Family records.
Statements of fact concerning personal or family history contained in family Bibles,
genealogies, charts, engravings on rings, inscriptions on family portraits, engravings
on urns, crypts, or tombstones, or the like.
(14) Records of documents affecting an interest in property.
The record of a document purporting to establish or affect an interest in property,
as proof of the content of the original recorded document and its execution and
delivery by each person by whom it purports to have been executed, if the record is
a record of a public office and an applicable statute authorizes the recording of
documents of that kind in that office.
(15) Statements in documents affecting an interest in property.
A statement contained in a document purporting to establish or affect an interest
in property if the matter stated was relevant to the purpose of the document, unless
dealings with the property since the document was made have been inconsistent
with the truth of the statement or the purport of the document.
(16) Statements in ancient documents.
Statements in a document in existence twenty years or more the authenticity of
which is established.
(17) Market reports, commercial publications.
Market quotations, tabulations, lists, directories, or other published compilations,
generally used and relied upon by the public or by persons in particular occupations.
(18) Learned treatises.
To the extent called to the attention of an expert witness upon cross-examination
or relied upon by the expert witness in direct examination, statements contained in
published treatises, periodicals, or pamphlets on a subject of history, medicine, or
other science or art, established as a reliable authority by the testimony or admission
of the witness or by other expert testimony or by judicial notice. If admitted, the
statements may be read into evidence but may not be received as exhibits.
(19) Reputation concerning personal or family history.
Reputation among members of a person's family by blood, adoption, or marriage,
or among a person's associates, or in the community, concerning a person's birth,
adoption, marriage, divorce, death, legitimacy, relationship by blood, adoption, or
marriage, ancestry, or other similar fact of personal or family history.
(20) Reputation concerning boundaries or general history.
Reputation in a community arising before the controversy, as to boundaries of or
customs affecting lands in the community, and reputation as to events of general
history important to the community or State or nation in which located.
(21) Reputation as to character.
Reputation of a person's character among associates or in the community.
(22) Judgment of previous conviction.
Evidence of a final judgment, entered after a trial or upon a plea of guilty (but not

upon a plea of nolo contendere), adjudging a person guilty of a crime punishable by
death or imprisonment in excess of one year, to prove any fact essential to sustain
the judgment, but not including, when offered by the prosecution In a criminal
prosecution for purposes other than impeachment, judgments against persons other
than the accused. The pendency of an appeal may be shown but does not affect
admissibility.
(23) Judgment as to personal, family or genera! history, or boundaries.
Judgments as proof of matters of personal, family or general history, or
boundaries, essential to the judgment, if the same would be provable by evidence of
reputation.
HISTORY: Amended effective October 1, 1992; November 1, 2 0 0 1 ; November 1,
2004
NOTES:
Advisory Committee Note. -- This rule is the federal rule verbatim. The 2001
amendment adopts changes made to Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6) effective
December 1, 2000.
Amendment Notes.-- The 2004 amendment deleted former Subdivision (24), the
residual provision for "other exceptions." For comparable provisions, see Rule 807.
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Utah R. Evid. Rule 807
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Copyright (c) 2008 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc.
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STATE RULES
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE
ARTICLE VIII. HEARSAY
Utah R. Evid. Rule 807 (2008)
Review Court Orders which may amend this Rule
Rule 807. Other exceptions.
A statement not specifically covered by Rule 803 or Rule 804 but having equivalent
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness is not excluded by the hearsay rule if
the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact;
(B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any
other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C)
the general purpose of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by
admission of the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be
admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the
adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse
party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, the proponent's intention to offer
the statement and the particulars of it, including the name and address of the
declarant.
HISTORY: Added effective November 1, 2004
NOTES:
Advisory Committee Note. -- This rule transfers identical provisions Rule 803(24) and
Rule 804(b)(5) to a new Rule 807 to reflect the organization found in the Federal
Rules of Evidence. No substantive change is intended. This rule is the federal rule,
verbatim.
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Attorneys for HK Contractors, Inc.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DOUG SCOTT, Personal Representative of
the ESTATE OF RUTH LYNDEVALL
SCOTT,
Plaintiff,

HK CONTRACTORS, INC/an Idaho
Corporation; and UTAH BARRICADE
COMPANY INC., a Utah Corporation,

)
)
)
jI
I

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDI H
GRANTING THE MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF
DEFENDANT HK CONTRACTORS, INC.

)
)
)

Civil No. 040924530

Judge: John Paul Kennedy
Defendant.

)

The defendant, HK Contractors, Inc., having submitted its initial motion for summary
judgment on or about February 28, 2006, with three separate hearings being held in regards to
that motion, being held on June 12, 2006, October 30, 2006, and April 6, 2007, for the purpose
of allowing plaintiff to submit additional information and brief additional issues to assist the
Court in responding to defendant's motion. The Court, specifically having given plaintiff
opportunities to submit expert testimony or other evidence of negligence or other fault on behalf
of the defendant in the June hearing, to submit expert testimony or other evidence pertaining to
causation after the October hearing, and finally, rendering a decision in the April 2007 hearing.
The Court aving heard argument of counsel on three occasions, having considered several

briefs, affidavits and other evidence, and otherwise being fully advised, grants defendant's
motion for summary judgment with prejudice on the merits and in doing so makes the following
findings of fact and conclusions of law
FINDINGS OF FACT
1

This matter arises out of an automobile accident which occurred on or about

November 18, 2003, when a vehicle driven by the plaintiff's decedent, Ruth Scott, was driving
westbound on 3900 South in Salt Lake County, Utah, whereupon she came upon a Utah
Central Valley Water Project road construction at approximately 875 West The defendant, HK
Contractors was acting as a contractor in performing the work on behalf of the Utah Central
Valley Water Project
2

While there were signs and barricades present directing the traffic in the

construction zone, Ms Scott drove her vehicle into an open trench resulting in injuries which
allegedly, according to the allegations of the plaintiff, caused her death some six months later
3

That Utah Valley Water Reclamation hired the defendant HK Contractors to

perform the construction work associated with placement of a water line which crossed 3900
South at the border of South Salt Lake City and Salt Lake County
4

That Central Valley Project retained the services of DMJ Engineers to develop a

traffic control plan
5.

That a traffic control plan was developed by professional engineer, Bradley

Paxman, and certified as compliant by Mr Paxman
6

That HK Contractors retained the services of Utah Barricade to perform

implementation of the traffic control plan

2

7

That affidavits submitted by Bradley Paxman professional engineer, indicate that

the traffic control plan complied with the manual and uniform traffic control design and all other
requirements of both South Salt Lake and Salt Lake County
8

That affidavits submitted by Doug Coleman of Utah Barricade established that

he had primary responsibility for Utah Barricade s work on the project in question, that he
reviewed the traffic control plan prepared by Mr Paxman and that at the time and place of the
accident in question, the model traffic control device plan was being implemented in
accordance with Mr Paxman's plan
9

Further, the affidavit of Steven Rosenkrance, the construction foreman for HK

Contractors, established at the time of the accident involving Ruth Scott, the model uniform
traffic control device was in the same condition as it was originally designed by Mr Paxman and
implemented by Utah Barricade
10

That after the initial hearing in June of 2006, the Court allowed plaintiff additional

opportunity to submit evidence regarding negligence on the part of the defendants
11
necessary

That after the second hearing, it was determined by the Court that it may not be
determine the existence of negligence or other fault on behalf of the defendant HK

Contractors due to the fact that the Court found that there was no evidence presented of
causation between the allegedly defective traffic control plan and the plaintiffs decedent's
accident
12

As a result of the October hearing, the Court allowed plaintiff to submit

admissible evidence on the issue of causation between the alleged negligence and the
accident
13

That the evidence submitted by plaintiff was in the form of an affidavit from the

plaintiffs husband, wherein it was indicated that approximately 2 hours after the accident in

3

question, a he hospital where Ms Scott was being treated, she told her husband that she was
confused about which way to travel through the construction area
14

No other evidence was submitted by the plaintiff in response to the specific

request for causation evidence after the October 2006 hearing Defendants objected to the
evidence submitted in the form of an affidavit from Mr Doug Scott, the decedent's husband, on
the basis that it constituted hearsay for which there was no exception or other means to allow
the statement to be admitted into evidence
15

No other specific new evidence was submitted by the plaintiff on the issue of

causation between the alleged negligence on the part of the defendant HK Contractors and
plaintiff's decedent's accident
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1

The Court finds that it is unnecessary to rule specifically on the issue of

defendant HK Contractor's fault or the existence of negligence due to the fact that there was no
evidence of causation presented by the plaintiff linking any alleged fault on the part of the
defendant HK Contractors to the accident suffered by the plaintiffs decedent
2

The Court specifically finds that the hearsay statements set forth above

attributable to the plaintiff's decedent in the affidavit of Doug Scott are inadmissible hearsay
and thus cannot be considered by the Court
3

That even if it were determined that the statements attributable to the plaintiff's

decedent were in fact admissible, they fall short of establishing a requisite causal relationship
between the accident and defendant HK Contractor's alleged negligence The statements fail
to eliminate other facts or issues that may have diverted plaintiff's decedent's attention or
caused her to be confused The fact that she was confused about knowing which way to go
through the construction area does not establish any direct relationship to any potential
misconduct or negligence on the part of the defendant
4

4

As a result of the foregoing, and due to a complete lack of evidence pertaining to

legal causation submitted by the plaintiff, the Court hereby grants the motion of the defendant
HK Contractors, Inc , and hereby dismisses all claims by the plaintiff against the defendant HK
Contractors, Inc associated with the death of Ms Scott or injuries claimed by Ms Scott and
dismisses the complaint of the plaintiff with prejudice and on the merits
DATED this ^

/V*-(/

day of

2007

BY THE COURT:

N
JOHN PAUL KENNEDY
District Court Judge
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